Security concerns are often a stumbling block that hinders the wide adoption and growth of mobile banking. Most mobile devices lack the capability to securely send end-to-end encrypted communication. As a result, sensitive information, such as a Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) and Primary Account Numbers (PANs), might be sent in plaintext form, creating a vulnerability in which such sensitive information can be intercepted by malicious parties and be used for fraudulent purposes. While some security measures can be provided by mobile network operators, for example, to provide encryption capabilities at a base station, the protection provided by such solutions is still limited because the communication is still sent in plaintext form at some point during the transmission. Other solutions require re-provisioning of users' mobile devices, for example, by over the air (OTA) provisioning, and such solutions can be costly in terms of both deployment and operating costs. Consequently, mobile operators have to either pass this cost onto their customers or absorb it themselves. Thus, the total cost of ownership (TCO) is also often a stumbling block that prevents the uptake and growth of mobile banking. Without a cost-effective and efficient way to securely send and receive communication with mobile devices, mobile banking operators are destined to incur losses or fail to roll out their mobile banking services entirely.
While mobile network operators struggle to find a cost-effective and efficient solution to enable mobile devices to securely send encrypted communications, the security vulnerability with mobile banking is not just limited to the potential interception of over the air communications. The interface between a mobile network and a payment processing network can also be vulnerable to infiltration by malicious parties because the security protocols employed by the two networks are often different, and the identities of the devices on one network may not always be known to the devices on the other network. As a result, malicious parties can attempt to connect to one network at the interface by pretending to be part of the other network.
For example, one way network devices can establish connections with one another is to use a three-way handshake of synchronize and acknowledge messages. A network device can initiate a connection by sending a synchronize message to a target device. In response to the receiving the synchronize message, the target device sends back a synchronize-acknowledgement message. The initiating device then sends an acknowledge message to the target device. Upon receiving the acknowledge message, a connection is established between the two network devices. To infiltrate a system, a malicious party does not have to know the identity of the target device or the port of the target device that would accept a connection. The malicious party can perform a port scan to determine what devices are on a network and which ports of a device can accept connections by sending out random synchronize messages and waiting for a synchronize-acknowledgement message reply. When the malicious party receives a synchronize-acknowledgement message, the malicious party can learn the identity of the target device and obtain network parameters of the target device from the synchronize-acknowledgement message. The malicious party can then infiltrate the network of the target device by directing an attack to the target device.
Embodiments of the present invention address these and other problems individually and collectively.